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In 1988, the Virginia General Assembly made two significant
changes with respect to child support awards. First, the authority
of the court has been extended so that the court may order support
for a child over the age of eighteen who is still attending high
school.1 In order to award support for a child who is no longer a
minor, the child must be "(i) a full-time high school senior, (ii) not
self-supporting and (iii) living in the home of the parent seeking or
receiving child support, until the child reaches the age of nineteen
or graduates from high school, whichever occurs first."2
The second major change provides general, non-binding guide-
lines for the court to use to determine child support.- Despite the
promulgation of these guidelines, the court must consider all evi-
dence presented relevant to any issues joined in the proceeding4
and the factors set out in section 20-107.2 of the Code of Virginia.5
If the court uses the child support guidelines, it must also consider
seven additional factors." These factors are:
1. Actual monetary support for other children, other family mem-
bers or former family members;
* Partner, Morano, Colan & Butler, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1966, University of Rich-
mond; J.D., 1970, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
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1. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(F) (Rep. Vol. 1988); id. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
2. Id. § 16.1-279(F); accord id. § 20-107.2.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, -108.2 (Curn. Supp. 1988). The federal Child Support En-
forcement Amendments of 1984 required each state to establish child support guidelines by
October 1, 1987, in order to remain eligible for federal funding for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305, 1321-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985)).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(A).
5. Id. § 20-108.1(B).
6. Id.
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2. Arrangements regarding custody of the children;
3. Imputed income to a party who is voluntarily unemployed or
voluntarily under employed; provided that income may not be im-
puted to the custodial parent when a child is not in school or where
child care services are not available and the cost of such child care
services are not included in the computations;
4. Debts of either party arising during the marriage for the bene-
fit of the child;
5. Debts incurred for production of income;
6. Direct payments ordered by the court for health plan coverage,
education expenses, or other court-ordered direct payments for the
benefit of the child; and
7. Extraordinary capital gains such as capital gains resulting from
the sale of the marital abode.7
Section 20-108.28 has been added to set out the actual child sup-
port guidelines. The guidelines allow the computation of a basic
support obligation based on the combined gross income of both
parents.9 "Gross income" is defined as income from all sources in-
cluding, but not limited to, "income from salaries, wages, commis-
sions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, inter-
est, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits,
workers' compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits,
disability insurance benefits, veterans' benefits, spousal support,
rental income, gifts, prizes or awards."'1 The table in section 20-
108.2 sets out a monthly basic child support obligation based upon
the combined gross income of the parents and the number of chil-
dren for whom support is being sought. A total child support obli-
gation may be established by adding extraordinary medical ex-
penses and work related child care costs to the basic child support
obligation from the schedule." Any determination of the total
child support obligation must also take into consideration all of the
factors enumerated in section 20-107.2 and section 20-108.1.12 Once
the court has determined the total child support obligation, each
parent's pro-rata share is computed by multiplying that parent's
7. Id.
8. Id. § 20-108.2.
9. Id. § 20-108.2(F).
10. Id. § 20-108.2(C).
11. Id. § 20-108.2(F).
12. See id. § 20-108.1(B).
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percentage of the combined gross income by the total child support
obligation. 13
The statute also sets out a review procedure to determine the
adequacy of the child support guidelines and the effect of the use
of the guidelines on the level of support awards. 4
B. Support Enforcement
The 1988 General Assembly added provisions to strengthen sup-
port enforcement, especially enforcement of administrative sup-
port orders issued by the Department of Social Services. The De-
partment of Social Services continues to have the authority to
issue administrative orders directing the payment of child support
and child and spousal support.15 In issuing such orders, the De-
partment of Social Services must consider the new child support
guidelines.""
Two legislative changes assist the Department in determining
the amount of child support. The Department now has the right to
subpoena financial records of both the obligor and the obligee. 17 In
addition, the Department may order the parties to disclose finan-
cial information and changes in financial situations to each other
and to the Department. 8 The Department of Social Services must
continue to make these administrative services available to indi-
viduals not receiving public assistance, but may charge a fee of no
more than $1.00 for these services. 9
These administrative orders provide for immediate withholding
from the obligor's earnings to satisfy current support obligations
and liquidation of arrearages. 0 A court entering an order for child
support has the option of ordering an immediate payroll
deduction.2'
Once an administrative support order is entered and filed with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, it may be en-
13. Id. § 20-108.2(F).
14. Id. § 20-108.2(G), (H).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
16. Id. The guidelines are set out in § 20-108.2 of the Virginia Code.
17. Id. § 63.1-250.1(C).
18. Id. § 63.1-250.1(B).
19. Id. § 63.1-250.2.
20. Id. § 63.1-258.1. The amount withheld, however, cannot exceed the maximum
amount permitted under § 34-29 of the Virginia Code. Id.
21. Id. § 20-79.2.
19881 567
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
forced by that court in the same manner as if it had been initially
entered by the court.22 Section 16.1-279(F) of the Code of Vir-
ginia" provides that support obligations, as they become due, con-
stitute a judgment by operation of law. This judgment is a lien
against real estate only when it is docketed in the jurisdiction
where the real estate is located.24
C. Spousal Support
Legislation passed in 1988 eliminates fault as an absolute bar to
spousal support.25 The court may no longer deny an award of sup-
port and maintenance to a spouse merely because a ground for di-
vorce based upon cruelty, desertion or conviction of a felony exists
against that spouse.26 Adultery remains, however, a statutory bar
to spousal support unless the court determines from clear and con-
vincing evidence that a denial of support would constitute a "man-
ifest injustice.' '27 In making such a determination, the court must
consider the respective degrees of fault during the marriage and
the relative economic circumstances of the parties.28
Even though fault is no longer an automatic bar to spousal sup-
port, the statute now provides that when determining whether to
award support and maintenance for a spouse, the court must con-
sider all of the circumstances and factors which contributed to the
dissolution of the marriage. This would specifically include fault
that qualifies as grounds for divorce."
D. Equitable Distribution
The 1988 legislature made substantial changes in section 20-
107.3 of the Code of Virginia.30 Section 20-107.3(A)3' has been
22. Id. § 16.1-241(B).
23. Id. § 16.1-279(F).
24. Id. Section 20-60.3(9) of the Virginia Code now requires that decrees for support
include notification that a support obligation becomes a judgment as it becomes due.
25. See Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988). Virginia now joins the overwhelm-
ing majority of states which have eliminated, at least in some form, many aspects of fault as
an absolute bar to entitlement to spousal support. See Butler & Russell, Casting Stones:
The Role of Fault in Virginia Divorce Proceedings, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 295 (1986).




30. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
31. Id. § 20-107.3(A).
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amended to provide guidance to determine the date for valuation
of marital property. The court shall determine the value of prop-
erty owned by the parties as of the date of the evidentiary hearing
on the valuation issue.12 A different valuation date may be used,
however, "in order to attain the ends of justice." 3 This amend-
ment is essentially a codification of the rule previously established
by the Virginia Court of Appeals. 4
The definition of marital property in section 20-107.3(A)(2)35 has
been amended to provide a presumption that marital property is
"jointly owned unless there is a deed, title or other clear indicia
that it is not jointly owned.""8
Section 20-107.3(C)37 now permits the court to order division or
transfer of jointly owned marital property.3 8 This is a substantial
change from the existing law as interpreted by the Virginia Court
of Appeals. 9 The court may divide or transfer the jointly owned
marital property by ordering the transfer of property, or any inter-
est therein, to one of the parties; permitting one party to purchase
the interest of the other if the purchasing party agrees to assume
any indebtedness secured by the property; or ordering sale of the
property by private or public means.40
In addition to ordering division or transfer of the property, the
court continues to have the power to grant a monetary award. The
amendment to section 20-107.3(D)4 1 specifies that the court's deci-
sion to grant a monetary award must be based upon the equities
and the rights and interests of each party in the marital property
and on the statutory factors. 2 This is a departure from the posi-
tion taken by the Virginia Court of Appeals.43
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987); Price v. Price, 4
Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E,2d 18
(1987).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 20-107.3(C).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 338 S.E.2d 159 (1985).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C)(i)-(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
41. Id. § 20-107.3(D).
42. Id. The factors are set out in § 20-107.3(E).
43. See Brinkley v. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139 (1987).
1988]
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Section 20-107.3(D)I" has also been amended to specify that a
monetary award, unless the court orders otherwise, shall constitute
a judgment within the meaning of section 8.01-42611 and that the
interest provisions of section 8.01-38246 shall apply to such
awards.4
Under changes made in 1988, the court may, in addition to mak-
ing a monetary award, direct payment of a percentage of the mari-
tal share of any pension, profit sharing or deferred compensation
plan or retirement benefit.48 The court shall only direct that pay-
ment be made as such benefits are payable, and the payments shall
not exceed fifty percent of the marital share of the benefits actu-
ally received by the party against whom the award is made.49 The
marital share is defined as "that portion of the total interest, the
right to which was earned during the marriage and before the last
separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one
of the parties intended that the separation be permanent. '50 The
present value of pension and retirement benefits has been elimi-
nated as a factor under section 20-107.3(E).5 1 This change makes it
clear that a pension is to be treated separately from all of the other
marital property, with the award to take effect only when the ben-
efits are received and with the award being in terms of a percent-
age of the benefit rather than a monetary award.
E. Procedure
The 1988 General Assembly made several jurisdictional and pro-
cedural changes relevant to divorce proceedings. Section 20-121 of
the Code of Virginia 52 permitted previously a merger of a decree
for divorce from bed and board with a decree for divorce from the
bond of matrimony after six months separation if there were "no
minor children born of the parties." There was no mention of
whether a divorce could be granted after a six month separation if
there were minor children adopted during the marriage. The 1988
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D).
45. Id. § 8.01-426 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
46. Id. § 8.01-382.
47. Id. § 20-107.3(D) (Cure. Supp. 1988); see also Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361
S.E.2d 364 (1987) (holding that a monetary award is the equivalent of a money judgment).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. § 20-107.3(E).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-121 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
570 [Vol. 22:565
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amendment clarifies this section by stating that a merger after a
six-month separation may occur only if there are no minor children
"born of either party and adopted by the other or adopted by both
parties." 3
The 1988 amendment to section 20-121.0254 clarifies that either
party which seeks a divorce based on a fault ground can, by mo-
tion, without amending the Bill of Complaint or Cross-Bill, request
a no-fault divorce after the requisite statutory separation period.
Section 20-9711 redefines domicile and residential requirements
for members of the Armed Forces. If a member of the Armed
Forces has been stationed in or has resided in Virginia for six
months prior to the commencement of the suit, that person is pre-
sumed to have been domiciled in and a bona fide resident of the
Commonwealth during that period.56 Being stationed or residing in
the Commonwealth includes being stationed upon a ship having its
home port within Virginia or at a military base located within
Virginia. 57
Section 20-99.1:151 was added to provide for acceptance of ser-
vice in divorce or annulment actions. The defendant may accept
service by signing a proof of service before any officer authorized to
administer oaths.59 In addition, service of process may be accepted
or waived by either party, upon voluntary execution of a notarized
writing or by the defendant's filing an answer by counsel in the
suit.6 0 Either method of service on a Virginia resident within the
Commonwealth has the same effect as if the process had been
served personally upon the defendant by a person authorized to
serve process.6' Acceptance of service pursuant to this section by a
non-resident outside the Commonwealth shall have the same effect
as an order of publication. 2
53. Id.
54. Id. § 20-121.02.
55. Id. § 20-97.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 20-99.1:1.
59. Id. § 20-99.1:1(A).
60. Id. This section further provides that the form for acceptance of process or waiver of
process may be provided in the clerk's office of the circuit court or may be drafted and filed
by counsel. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 20-99.1:1(B).
1988]
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An amendment to section 8.01-328.1"3 permits long arm jurisdic-
tion over a defendant who conceived or fathered a child in the
Commonwealth. Jurisdiction under this section is valid only upon
proof of personal service on the non-resident. 4
Section 20-796'5 was amended to permit the circuit court in a di-
vorce case to refer to the Juvenile & Domestic Relations District
Court any matters pertaining to spousal support and maintenance
and child support and custody." Such a transfer may be made to
any Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court within the Com-
monwealth that constitutes a more appropriate forum."'
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property
1. Classification of Property
a. Transmutation
The Virginia Court of Appeals has followed and clarified the
transmutation doctrine established by the Virginia Supreme Court
in Smoot v. Smoot6 8 In Westbrook v. Westbrook,6 e the husband
owned unimproved land before the marriage. After the marriage,
when the wife signed a construction note and deed of trust for im-
provements, the husband agreed in writing that the property
would be marital. The court held that because the parties treated
the real estate as marital property and expressed the intent that it
be marital property, it was transmuted to marital property.70
In Lambert v. Lambert,71 the court indicated that transmutation
may also occur when there is active appreciation of separate prop-
erty during the marriage.72 The court pointed out that under the
63. Id. § 8.01-328.1.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 20-79.
66. Id. § 20-79(c).
67. Id.
68. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
69. 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988).
70. Id. at 453-54, 364 S.E.2d at 528.
71. 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
72. Id. at 104-05, 367 S.E.2d at 190. In Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3 (Va. Ct. App. Feb.
2, 1988), the Virginia Court of Appeals broached the concept of transmutation of separate
property to marital property when one of the spouses made significant contributions to the
property during the marriage. In Booth, Mr. Booth owned a business before the marriage.
During the marriage, the efforts of both parties increased the value of the business. Mr.
[Vol. 22:565
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unitary concept of property established by Smoot," property can-
not consist of a portion that is separate and a portion that is mari-
tal.7 4 The Virginia equitable distribution statute clearly states that
"[i]ncome received from, and the increase in value of, separate
property during the marriage is separate property. '76 However, the
Lambert court concluded that this statutory admonition does not
necessarily apply to all circumstances.76  Although the statute
clearly applies to passive appreciation or appreciation caused by
economic factors alone, the court commented:
[O]ur belief that Smoot embraces the doctrine of transmutation
leads us to conclude that the statute may not bar the transmutation
of separate property to marital property when there is an apprecia-
tion in value of the separate property due to the efforts of either or
both of the parties during the marriage.7"
b. Gifts
While separate property may be transmuted into marital prop-
erty, marital property cannot become separate property absent an
express agreement of the parties.78  Even though section 20-
107.3(A)(1)(ii) of the Code of Virginia7e classifies property acquired
during the marriage by gift from a source other than the other
Booth operated the business, and Mrs. Booth made contributions in the form of direct loans
to the business, credit guarantees and occasional office assistance. The court held that the
contributions of both parties during the marriage transmuted the business to marital prop-
erty. However, the court of appeals withdrew this decision on February 26, 1988. The with-
drawal was not the result of second thoughts on the part of the appellate court, but was at
the request of the appellant. The case has been scheduled for reargument and reconsidera-
tion. The ultimate "permanent" opinion of the court of appeals will not necessarily change
the transmutation approach taken in the first decision in Booth and followed in Lambert.
The court seems content with the concept of transmutation because it "broadens the pool"
of assets the court can consider for equitable distribution.
73. Smoot, 233 Va. at 441, 357 S.E.2d at 730-31.
74. Lambert, 6 Va. App. at 104, 367 S.E.2d at 190. In reaching this conclusion, the court
cited Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985), and Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C.
App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985). These cases hold that active appreciation of separate prop-
erty is marital property. Active appreciation is defined as appreciation "resulting from the
contributions, monetary or otherwise, by one or both of the spouses." Wade, 72 N.C. App. at
378-80, 325 S.E.2d at 268.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (Cure. Supp. 1988).
76. Lambert, 6 Va. App. at 104, 367 S.E.2d at 190.
77. Id. at 104-05, 367 S.E.2d at 190.
78. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 20 -107.3(A)(1)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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partner as separate property, the Virginia Court of Appeals has
recognized in at least four recent decisions" that such transactions
must actually be gifts to one partner for the property to be classi-
fied as separate property. In Brown v. Brown,"' as an estate plan-
ning device, the husband's father transferred an interest in real es-
tate to the husband for less than its full value. For this reason, the
trial court found that only 82% of the real estate was marital prop-
erty. The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that it is im-
proper to treat property as part separate and part marital.8 2
In Wagner v. Wagner,83 the transaction was structured as a
purchase, with the wife executing a note to her father which he
later forgave. The wife argued that the property was a gift from
her father because she did not "acquire" it when she obtained title
to it but rather when she paid for it. The court of appeals dis-
agreed, holding that the wife acquired the property when she ob-
tained the title and not when the debt was discharged. 4 The char-
acter of property as separate or marital must be determined as of
the date it is acquired.85
In Cousins v. Cousins,"8 the wife argued that the marital home,
titled in the names of both parties as tenants by the entirety, was
her separate property because it was an advancement on her inher-
itance from her parents. The court of appeals held that property
titled in the names of both parties cannot be classified as separate
property.8 7
c. Disability Benefits
The Virginia Court of Appeals had the opportunity to address
classification of disability income as a marital asset in Brinkley v.
Brinkley."' The Brinkley opinion touched upon the issue of disa-
bility income and noted that there is a split of authority on this
80. Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988); Brown v. Brown, 5 Va.
App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987); Cousins v. Cousins, 5 Va. App. 156, 360 S.E.2d 882 (1987);
Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
81. Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987).
82. Id. at 243, 361 S.E.2d at 367.
83. 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407.
84. Id. at 404, 358 S.E.2d at 410.
85. Id.
86. 5 Va. App. 156, 360 S.E.2d 882 (1987).
87. Id. at 159, 360 S.E.2d at 884.
88. 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139 (1987).
574 [Vol. 22:565
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
issue in other jurisdictions. 9 However, there was insufficient evi-
dence in the record to determine whether and to what extent disa-
bility benefits could be considered as marital property, and there-
fore, the court was unable to make a specific ruling.90
d. Effect of Classification
The Virginia Court of Appeals has made it clear that classifica-
tion of arguably separate property as marital property does not
necessarily mean that spouses have equal interests in that marital
property."1 Classification of the property as marital merely en-
larges the pool of marital assets and permits the court to make a
more equitable monetary award.2 The court must consider the
manner in which the asset was acquired in determining the
amount of the monetary award. 3
2. Valuation
Under the recent statutory amendment to section 20-107.3, 9' the
date of valuation for purposes of equitable distribution is the date
of the evidentiary hearing unless an alternate date is necessary to
meet the ends of justice. 5 This statutory change is a slight modifi-
cation of the rule set out by the Virginia Court of Appeals in
Mitchell v. Mitchell. 6 In Wagner v. Wagner,97 the court restated
the Mitchell rule by holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in valuing property as of the date of the evidentiary
hearing. The Wagner court commented that the date of the evi-
dentiary hearing may not have been the proper date for valuation
had either party impaired or taken any action otherwise affecting
the value of the property during the separation of the parties.98
89. Id. at 140, 361 S.E.2d at 143 (citing Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353, 692 S.W.2d
601 (1985); Freeman v. Freeman, 468 So. 2d 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Lookingbill v.
Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 483 A.2d 1 (1984); Stroshine v. Stroshine, 98 N.M. 742, 652 P.2d
1193 (1982); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978)).
90. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. at 140, 361 S.E.2d at 143.
91. See, e.g., Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 106, 367 S.E.2d 184, 190 (1988); West-
brook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 454, 364 S.E.2d 523, 528 (1988); Brown v. Brown, 5 Va.
App. 233, 242, 361 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1987).
92. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. at 446, 364 S.E.2d at 528.
93. Brown, 5 Va. App. at 243, 361 S.E.2d at 367.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 30-51.
96. 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987).
97. 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
98. Id. at 406, 358 S.E.2d at 411.
5751988]
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Further, if there were peculiar facts or circumstances which would
produce an unfair result, the use of the date of the evidentiary
hearing may not be appropriate. 9
Whatever valuation date is used, it is clear that the burden is on
each party to present sufficient evidence of valuation. In Bowers v.
Bowers,100 the court held that because the wife did not meet her
burden of proof in showing the value of the husband's retirement
plan, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making a mone-
tary award without considering the value of those benefits.101
3. Monetary Award
In Brinkley v. Brinkley, 02 the Virginia Court of Appeals at-
tempted to provide guidance to trial courts in making equitable
distribution monetary awards by setting out certain steps which
the court must follow. First, the court must determine the legal
title, ownership, and value of all property and whether that prop-
erty is marital or separate.' 0 3 Second, the court must determine the
rights and interests of each party in the marital property. Third,
the court must determine, based upon the equities and rights and
interests of each party in the marital property, whether a monetary
award in favor of either party is warranted. 04 Finally, after the
court has determined that a monetary award is warranted, it must
determine the amount of the award and the method of payment
after consideration of the eleven statutory factors set out in section
20-107.3(E) of the Virginia Code. 05
The Brinkley court discussed further the manner in which a
lump-sum award may be made. In Brinkley, the trial court had
ordered the husband to pay the wife a lump-sum monetary award
of $3,000 and also had ordered him to pay her an amount equal to
thirty-six percent of the total of his monthly pensions. The court
99. Id.
100. 4 Va. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 546 (1987).
101. Id. at 620, 359 S.E.2d at 552.
102. 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139 (1987).
103. Id. at 136, 361 S.E.2d at 140.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 137, 361 S.E.2d at 141. The 1988 General Assembly changed this approach
and made it clear that the court's decision to grant a monetary award must also be based on
consideration of the statutory factors. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 1988). It
should also be noted that a 1988 amendment deleted the present value of pension and re-
tirement benefits as a factor under § 20-107.3(E) so that there are now only ten statutory
factors. See supra text accompanying notes 30-51.
[Vol. 22:565576
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of appeals held that it was error to order a lump-sum monetary
award as well as payment of a percentage of the pensions. In so
holding the court observed that the effect of the trial court's order
was to give the wife two monetary awards, while the equitable dis-
tribution statute permits only one monetary award.106
4. Consideration of Fault
Among the factors which the court must consider in making a
monetary award are the "circumstances and factors which contrib-
uted to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including any
ground for divorce under the provisions of section 20-91(1), (3) or
(6) or section 20-95. ''107 In Cousins v. Cousins,"0 8 the husband ar-
gued that where the final divorce was granted on the "no-fault"
ground of a one year separation, the court was barred from any
finding of fault. Therefore, he contended that the court was pre-
cluded from considering fault when making an equitable distribu-
tion award. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that under the
statutory directive to consider factors which may have contributed
to the dissolution of the marriage, the court may consider more
than the grounds for divorce. 09 Accordingly, the trial court prop-
erly considered evidence of the husband's fault, which contributed
to the dissolution of the marriage, when making an equitable dis-
tribution award."l0
5. Methods of Distribution
Several recent decisions have clarified the limits of the court's
authority to order or permit the actual distribution of property. It
is clear that prior to the 1988 legislative changes"' the court did
not have authority to order a party to convey an interest in jointly
owned marital property.112 In Wagner v. Wagner,113 the Virginia
106. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. at 139, 361 S.E.2d at 142. The 1988 amendment, however, now
specifically permits the court to order a lump-sum award as well as payment of a percentage
of pension benefits. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Cum. Supp. 1988); see supra text accom-
panying notes 30-51.
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(5).
108. 5 Va. App. 156, 360 S.E.2d 882 (1987).
109. Id. at 159, 360 S.E.2d at 884.
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 30-51 (discussing the 1988 amendment to V.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
112. See Lowe v. Lowe, 233 Va. 431, 357 S.E.2d 31 (1987); Clayberg v. Clayberg, 4 Va.
App. 218, 355 S.E.2d 902 (1987). McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 338 S.E.2d 159
(1985).
113. 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
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Court of Appeals held that the trial court cannot give one party
the right to purchase the other's share of jointly owned property
because that would have the same effect as ordering a transfer of
jointly owned property. In addition, the court cannot order a hus-
band's corporation to transfer property to the wife."'
Although the court can partition marital property in divorce
cases, 1 5 such partition must conform to section 8.01-811I6 of the
Virginia Code so that an owner is paid a sum of money that re-
flects his interest in the property.11.7 The divorce court cannot
equalize the assets of the parties under the guise of partition with-
out consideration of all of the factors relevant to partition cases."'
The court cannot partition assets not in existence at the time of
the divorce." 9
Under the provisions of section 20-107.3(D), 20 a spouse, against
whom a monetary award is made, may satisfy the award by a con-
veyance of property, and the consent of the recipient of the award
is not required. 121 The court, however, should not approve a trans-
fer which will place the burden of selling the property on the re-
ceiving spouse and which will net the receiving spouse less than
the monetary award. 2 Thus, in Payne v. Payne,23 the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in approving the husband's
election to transfer California real estate to the wife. The wife
would have had the burden of selling property located several
thousand miles from her current residence and would have in-
curred expenses connected with the sale, such as a real estate com-
mission, pro-rated taxes and other incidental expenses.124
114. Taylor v. Taylor, 5 Va. App. 436, 442, 364 S.E.2d 244, 248 (1988).
115. Clayberg v. Clayberg, 4 Va. App. 218, 355 S.E.2d 902 (1987); Morris v. Morris, 3 Va.
App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-81 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
117. Clayberg, 4 Va. App. at 221-22, 355 S.E.2d at 904.
118. Id.
119. Taylor, 5 Va. App. at 442, 364 S.E.2d at 247 (holding that the court had no author-
ity to order the husband to reimburse the wife for one-half the proceeds of jointly held
certificates of deposit spent by the husband during the separation; the court could consider
the certificates as marital property in making a monetary award).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
121. Payne v. Payne, 5 Va. App. 359, 366, 363 S.E.2d 428, 432 (1987).
122. Id. at 367, 363 S.E.2d at 432.




6. Enforcement of Award
Once the court has ordered a monetary award, that award is the
equivalent of a money judgment, but payment cannot be enforced
through the court's contempt powers.125 In Brown v. Brown,126 the
trial court ordered the husband to pay a monetary award of
$173,310.65 to the wife within 120 days. The Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that while the trial court has discretion to fix a date
upon which an award is due and payable, it lacks authority to or-
der mandatory payment subject to enforcement by its contempt
powers. 127 The court distinguished between a spousal support
award and a monetary award. Spousal support involves a legal
duty flowing from one spouse to the other by virtue of the mar-
riage relationship. 28 A monetary award, on the other hand, in-
volves an adjustment of the equities, rights, and interests of the
parties in marital property. 29 Thus, the trial court exceeded its au-
thority in making the monetary award subject to enforcement by
contempt.
7. Waiver
In Bragan v. Bragan,130 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
there can be a waiver of rights to equitable distribution. The par-
ties had executed a property settlement agreement before the
adoption of section 20-107.3 of the Code of Virginia. 3' That agree-
ment contained a broad provision wherein both parties agreed that
they would not seek "provision for support or division of property
in addition or in substitution of the provisions in this Agreement
in a decree of divorce.' 2 Section 20-107.3 was in effect at the time
the bill of complaint for divorce was filed. The wife claimed that
she was entitled to a monetary award based on the value of the
husband's pension plan, because disposition of the pension was not
expressly provided for in the agreement. She asserted that her
right to the pension plan was one acquired after execution of the
125. Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 247, 361 S.E.2d at 369.
128. Id. at 246, 361 S.E.2d at 368.
129. Id.
130. 4 Va. App. 516, 358 S.E.2d 757 (1987).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1988); Bragan, 4 Va. App. at 518, 358 S.E.2d
at 758.
132. Bragan, 4 Va. App. at 518, 358 S.E.2d at 759.
19881 579
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
agreement when the equitable distribution statute was enacted.
The court held that the intent of the agreement would be thwarted
if the wife were permitted to repudiate her release, and that the
subsequent change in the law does not permit the unilateral rejec-
tion of an agreement.1 33
B. Spousal Support
1. Amount of Award
In Payne v. Payne,3 4 the Virginia Court of Appeals stated once
again that a spouse entitled to spousal support has the right to be
maintained in the standard of living established during the mar-
riage. 35 The needs of the supported spouse, however, must be bal-
anced against the supporting spouse's financial ability to pay.3 6 An
award of spousal support must be based upon all of the factors set
out in section 20-107.1 of the Code of Virginia.13 7
Pursuant to section 20-107.1,13 one of the factors which the
court must consider in awarding spousal support is the distribution
of property under section 20-107.3.139 The monetary award should
be considered only as an asset from which potential income may be
derived.140 The court may not consider the principal of the mone-
tary award as income to the spouse seeking support.14' In Ray v.
Ray,' 42 the wife's share of marital property was to be partially sat-
isfied by five annual cash payments of $29,000 each. The trial court
found that the monetary award was sufficient to meet the wife's
needs and determined that she was not entitled to any more in-
come in the form of spousal support. The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the wife was not required to invade her estate
to relieve the support obligation of her former husband.143
In determining the supporting spouse's ability to pay, the court
133. Id. at 518-19, 358 S.E.2d at 759.
134. 5 Va. App. 359, 363 S.E.2d 428 (1987).
135. Id. at 363, 363 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 26, 341
S.E.2d 208, 210 (1986)).
136. Id. at 363, 363 S.E.2d at 430.
137. Id.; see Wooley v. Wooley, 3 Va. App. 337, 346, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
139. Id. § 20-107.3(8).
140. See Ray v. Ray, 4 Va. App. 509, 358 S.E.2d 754 (1987).
141. Id. at 513-14, 358 S.E.2d at 756-57.
142. 4 Va. App. 509, 358 S.E.2d 754 (1987).




may consider that spouse's earning capacity and all sources of in-
come.144 Earning capacity must be based upon circumstances in ev-
idence at the time of the award. 45 In Payne v. Payne,46 the court
awarded $1,000 per month spousal support and $400 per month
child support, even though the husband's net disposable income
from his self-employment was approximately $1,600 per month.147
The trial judge commented that he expected the husband's income
to change because the husband was capable of making more
money.' 48 The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was no
evidence that the husband could increase his income. 49 The court
commented that although the trial court may consider earning ca-
pacity as well as actual earnings, a support award cannot be based
upon anticipated future circumstances. 50
2. Waiver
In Brown v. Brown,'5' the Virginia Court of Appeals considered
the issue of waiver of spousal support. In Brown, the wife's counsel
stated in open court, "Your Honor, we are not seeking spousal sup-
port.' 1 52 The wife's testimony reiterated her attorney's statement.
The court held that having waived spousal support, the wife was
barred from raising the issue on remand. 53
3. Jurisdiction
The court may award spousal support only when it has the req-
uisite in personam jurisdiction to do so.154 In Morris v. Morris, 55
the Virginia Court of Appeals found that the portion of the divorce
decree awarding spousal support was invalid, because the court did
not have in personam jurisdiction of the husband. 56 In Morris, the
144. Id. at 513, 358 S.E.2d at 756.
145. Payne v. Payne, 5 Va. App. 359, 363, 363 S.E.2d 428, 430 (1987).
146. 5 Va. App. 359, 363 S.E.2d 430 (1987).
147. Id. at 362-63, 363 S.E.2d at 430.
148. Id. at 363, 363 S.E.2d at 430.
149. Id. at 364, 363 S.E.2d at 431.
150. Id. at 363, 363 S.E.2d at 430.
151. 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987).
152. Id. at 245, 361 S.E.2d at 368.
153. Id.
154. Gibson v. Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 364 S.E.2d 518 (1988); Morris v. Morris, 4 Va.
App. 539, 359 S.E.2d 104 (1987).
155. 4 Va. App. 539, 359 S.E.2d 104 (1987).
156. A copy of the complaint was also mailed but was returned as undeliverable. Id. at
541, 359 S.E.2d at 105.
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
wife had filed an affidavit giving the husband's last known address
in North Carolina and obtained service by publication. She was
granted a divorce which incorporated the parties' property settle-
ment agreement. The property settlement agreement provided for
spousal support.
The court of appeals recognized that pursuant to section 8.01-
328.1(A)(8)'11 of the Code of Virginia a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who has executed a support agreement
in Virginia. Service under this section, however, must be made per-
sonally, not by order of publication.158 Service on a non-resident by
order of publication vests the court with in rem jurisdiction
only."'59 Where the court has in rem jurisdiction and not in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a party, it has no authority to enter an
award of spousal support against that party. 60 Thus, the trial
court improperly awarded spousal support to the wife.' 6'
In Gibson v. Gibson,62 the court of appeals addressed the ques-
tion of the full faith and credit which must be accorded to a for-
eign divorce decree. The court concluded that spousal support and
maintenance and property rights in Virginia are cognizable legal
obligations which survive an ex parte foreign divorce decree.6 3
In Gibson, divorce proceedings were filed by the wife in Virginia
and by the husband in Tennessee. The Tennessee court granted
Mr. Gibson a default divorce judgment on fault grounds at a hear-
ing held without notice to his wife. However, the Tennessee court
later granted Mrs. Gibson's motion to set aside that part of the
decree pertaining to support and property rights, but not that part
pertaining to fault. Mr. Gibson argued that the Virginia court had
to give full faith and credit to the Tennessee divorce decree and
not award spousal support because the Tennessee court had found
Mrs. Gibson at fault. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that
because Mrs. Gibson did not receive proper notice and was pre-
vented from appearing and litigating the issue of fault, the Tennes-
see court did not have in personam jurisdiction on that issue.'
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
158. 4 Va. App. at 542, 359 S.E.2d at 106.
159. Id. at 543, 359 S.E.2d at 106-07.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 542, 359 S.E.2d at 106.
162. 5 Va. App. 426, 364 S.E.2d 518 (1988).
163. Id. at 429, 364 S.E.2d at 519.
164. Id. at 434, 364 S.E.2d at 522.
[Vol. 22:565
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Accordingly, the court held that "the finding of fault by the Ten-
nessee court, while entitled to full faith and credit in determining
parties' marital status, is not binding upon the parties when con-
sidering spousal support pursuant to Code section 20-107.1. ''165
4. Recrimination
In Surbey v. Surbey,166 the court of appeals applied the doctrine
of recrimination and affirmed an award of spousal support to a
wife who had committed adultery. The trial court had found that
both parties were at fault in causing the separation and that both
had been guilty of adultery subsequent to the separation. Accord-
ingly, under the recrimination doctrine, neither the husband nor
the wife could use adultery as a ground for divorce, and the divorce
was granted on the ground of separation without cohabitation for
more than one year.167
The Surbey court was required to interpret section 20-
91(9)(c),1 8 which provides that a no-fault divorce "shall in no way
lessen any obligation any party may otherwise have to support the
spouse unless such party shall prove that there exists in the favor
of such party some other ground of divorce under this section or
[section] 20-95. ''169 The court held that
because neither party is entitled to successfully assert adultery as a
ground for divorce, and because there was a finding supported by
the evidence that both parties were at fault in causing the separa-
tion, there did not exist a ground for divorce under any other sec-
tion of the Code except [section] 20-91(9)(a).170
The court construed the term "fault" to mean "grounds which le-
gally may be used by one party as a basis for obtaining a divorce
from the other party." ' Under this construction, the fault bar to
spousal support was inapplicable, and the trial court did not err in
granting spousal support.172
165. Id. at 434, 364 S.E.2d at 522-23.
166. 5 Va. App. 119, 360 S.E.2d 873 (1988).
167. Id. at 123, 360 S.E.2d at 875.
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
169. Id.
170. Surbey, 5 Va. App. at 123, 360 S.E.2d at 876.
171. Id. at 124, 360 S.E.2d at 876.
172. Id.
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C. Grounds for Divorce
In Graves v. Graves,17 3 the court of appeals held that the trial
court erred in granting a divorce based upon a one year separation.
At the Commissioner's hearing on October 1, 1984, the wife testi-
fied that the parties had been living separate and apart without
interruption since October 3, 1983.174 No evidence was presented to
the trial court concerning whether the parties had remained sepa-
rated after the Commissioner's hearing, even though counsel repre-
sented to the court that the separation had continued. 7 ' The court
of appeals held that mere representations of counsel were not evi-
dence.17 Any agreed stipulations of fact must be submitted to the
court as such and received by it in lieu of evidence of these facts. 1"
Because the court did not receive counsel's representations as a
stipulation, there was no evidentiary basis for concluding that the
parties had lived separate and apart for a period in excess of one
year.178
In Wagner v. Wagner,7 9 the court of appeals held that the trial
court erred in granting the husband a divorce on the ground of
desertion. The Commissioner found, based on the testimony of the
parties and witnesses, that the husband agreed to the wife's depar-
ture from the marital home. 80 The court held that separation by
mutual consent is not desertion.' 8 '
D. Procedural Aspects of Divorce Cases
The trial court has authority, pursuant to section 20-103 of the
Code of Virginia,8 2 to enter orders to compel a spouse to pay any
sums necessary for spousal or child support, to provide for use and
possession of the family residence, and to preserve the estate of
either spouse. In Taylor v. Taylor,8 3 the Virginia Court of Appeals
173. 4 Va. App. 326, 357 S.E.2d 554 (1987).
174. Id. at 332, 357 S.E.2d at 557-58.




179. 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
180. Id. at 407, 358 S.E.2d at 412.
181. Id. at 409, 358 S.E.2d at 413 (citing Arrington v. Arrington, 196 Va. 86, 82 S.E.2d
548 (1954)).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
183. 5 Va. App. 436, 441, 364 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1988).
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held that this statute gives the trial judge authority to make provi-
sions for the payment of the family mortgage during the pendency
of the suit. Such authority begins with the filing of the suit and
terminates upon the final adjudication of all issues, including a
hearing on remand."8 4 The Taylor court commented that when the
court orders one of the parties to make the mortgage payments on
jointly owned real estate, it should indicate whether the payments
are to be considered spousal support, child support, or a provision
for the use and possession of the marital estate. 85 Such a designa-
tion would be helpful in subsequent partition proceedings on the
question of whether credit should be given to the party making the
payments.18
6
In Westbrook v. Westbrook,18 7 the court of appeals considered
the application of the "clean hands" doctrine in equitable distribu-
tion proceedings. In a deposition, the wife denied committing adul-
tery during the marriage. At the Commissioner's hearing, she ad-
mitted that she had lied in the deposition. The husband claimed
that since the wife perjured herself in the depositions, her bill of
complaint should be dismissed.188
The court of appeals held that the "clean hands" doctrine is un-
available when it is asserted in the context of equitable distribu-
tion proceedings"8 9 pursuant to section 20-107.3(A);19 ° the court
must consider which property is separate and which is marital.' 19
This is a mandatory duty placed upon the trial court by statute
and does not provide for any equitable considerations such as the
"clean hands" doctrine.'92 Neither equitable maxims nor perjury
are included among the eleven factors which the court must con-
sider in making a monetary award.' 93 The wife's untruthfulness
had no bearing on property classification or upon the equities and
rights and interests of the parties in that property. Accordingly,
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 442, 364 S.E.2d at 247.
187. 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988).
188. Id. at 455, 364 S.E.2d at 529.
189. Id. at 457, 364 S.E.2d at 530.
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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the trial court properly refused to dismiss the wife's suit upon such
grounds."'
E. Child Support
In making a child support award, the court must consider all the
statutory factors set forth in section 20-107.2(2) of the Code of Vir-
ginia.195 As with consideration of the spousal support factors, the
court does not have to quantify or elaborate what weight or consid-
eration it has given to each statutory factor.196 All that is necessary
is that the court's findings have some foundation based on the evi-
dence presented. 1
97
In Yohay v. Ryan, 98 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that in a
support modification proceeding, the trial court is not required to
consider all of the factors which the court must consider in an ini-
tial support proceeding."99 Instead, the party moving for modifica-
tion must prove both a material change in circumstances and that
such change justifies an alteration of the amount of support."' In
addition, a party moving for a reduction must show that his lack of
ability to pay is not due to his own voluntary act.20 ' The party
moving for reduction is not, however, required to prove that the
reduction is in the best interests of the children. 0 2
194. Id. at 458, 364 S.E.2d at 530.
195. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 410, 358 S.E.2d 407, 413 (1987) (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.2(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
196. Id. at 410, 358 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Wooley v. Wooley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349
S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986) for the proposition that in determining spousal support, the trial
court need not quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to
each of the statutory factors).
197. Id. at 410, 358 S.E.2d at 414.
198. 4 Va. App. 559, 359 S.E.2d 320 (1987).
199. Id. at 567, 359 S.E.2d at 325. The support factors to which the court referred are set
out in VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
200. Yohay, 4 Va. App. at 566, 359 S.E.2d at 324.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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